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Since the American Law Institute (ALI) launched in the early twentieth century, 
its mission has been “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration of justice.”1  
A principal way it has pursued that mission has been through its Restatements of 
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Law project.2  By their nature, Restatements of Law reflect tensions between what it 
means to “restate” and reform the law.  As the ALI has grown and the legal profession 
has evolved with social and political changes, the organization has ensured 
professionalism and the incorporation of diverse views to manage this tension at the 
heart of its Restatement projects. 
Against this backdrop, the ALI announced in 2014 that it would begin a 
Restatement of Copyright Law project in 2015 and we, as copyright lawyers and 
scholars, applaud that decision.3  The ALI specified that the project   
will focus on the generally applicable parts of copyright law, including the subject 
matter of copyright; the scope of the exclusive rights granted by copyright; copyright 
‘formalities’; the rules governing ownership and transfer of copyrights; the duration of 
copyright; the standard for copyright infringement; rules regarding the circumvention 
of copyright protection systems; defenses to copyright infringement, including the first 
sale limitation and fair use; and remedies, including actual and statutory damages, 
attorney[’s] fees, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; and criminal penalties.4 
Since this announcement, the Restatement of Copyright Law project has been a 
lightning rod for controversy.  The Authors Guild, the Association of American 
Publishers, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry 
Association of America, and fourteen other organizations wrote to the ALI 
expressing the worry that “the conception of the project and the recent appointment 
of its Reporter indicate a significant risk that it would be used as a vehicle not to 
restate the law of copyright, but, rather, to rewrite it to benefit a particular viewpoint 
in the copyright debate.”5  The Acting Register of Copyrights wrote to the ALI that 
the Restatement project is “misguided” and that “[t]he need for the Restatement is 
unclear, as an extensive body of positive copyright law already exists.”6  The 
Copyright & Literary Property Committee of the New York City Bar Association 
prepared a report against the project on the basis that “rather than simply clarifying 
or restating that law, the draft offers commentary and interpretations beyond the 
current state of the law that appear intended to shape current and future copyright 
policy.”7  The head of the National Music Publishers’ Association called the project 
a “sham attempt to undermine hard fought principles of understood law” and urged 
that “[t]his thinly-veiled attempt to subvert the law and undermine creators . . . must 
 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. The American Law Institute Announces Four New Projects, AM. LAW INST. (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/E6S5-827N. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Letter from Am. Photographic Artists et al. to ALI Officers and Dirs. (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/3BS3-M7KS. 
 6. Letter from Karyn Temple Claggett, Acting Reg. of Copyrights, to ALI President David Levi 
et al., Re:  Council Draft No. 1, Restatement of the Law, Copyright (Jan. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZC67-
23X7. 
 7. COPYRIGHT & LITERARY PROP. COMM., RECOMMENDATION TO REJECT THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PROPOSAL TO CREATE A RESTATEMENT OF LAW, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/GG89-DXYV. 
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be stopped.”8  And just last year, five members of Congress criticized the project, 
noting that “laws created through federal statute, including federal copyright law, are 
ill-suited for treatment in a Restatement because the law is clearly articulated by 
Congress in both the statute and the legislative history.”9  They elaborated that “any 
Restatement or other treatise relied on by courts that attempts to diminish the 
importance of the statutory text or legislative history relating to that text would 
warrant concern.”10  Furthermore, they asserted that “[c]ourts should rely on that 
statutory text and legislative history, not Restatements that attempt to replace the 
statutory language and legislative history established by Congress with novel 
interpretations.”11 
Some commentators have expressed skepticism that these critiques are honest.  
Instead, they suspect that they are a smoke screen for critics’ fears that a Restatement 
of Copyright Law would provide an understanding of copyright law that would 
undermine the ability of content creators and others to shape the law in their favor.12  
Whatever the truth, for purposes of this Article, we accept the critics at their word.  
And we think their criticisms of the Restatement of Copyright Law project are 
exaggerated and mistaken.  As we contend herein, the act of restating in the manner 
that is the ALI’s signature form is consistent with the practice of law generally, which 
inevitably involves acts of legal exposition and interpretation.13  It is not inherently 
partisan but a professional practice in which all lawyers are taught to engage.  Stating 
the law, saying what it means, and then applying it in a particular context are what 
lawyers and judges do all the time.  In this way, restating—or “retelling”—the law 
is both normal and inevitable.  A restatement of law is another way of saying what 
the law is. 
To be sure, copyright law is grounded in a federal statute, while the more common 
ALI Restatements of the Law, such as the Restatements of Contracts and Torts, are 
 
 8. Chris Cooke, Music Industry Hits Out at American Law Institute’s ‘Restatement’ of Copyright 
Law, COMPLETE MUSIC UPDATE (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/YBN5-3MQU. 
 9. Letter from Sen. Thom Tillis, Rep. Ben Cline, Rep. Theodore E. Deutch, Rep. Martha Roby, 
and Rep. Harley Rouda to ALI Dir. Richard L. Revesz (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/LWE9-3YYZ 
[hereinafter Letter from Sen. Tillis et al.]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Brian L. Frye (@brianlfrye), TWITTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 3:15 PM EST), 
https://twitter.com/brianlfrye/status/1202683033595400194 (“I find it deeply amusing that the primary 
objection to the restatement of copyright is that the ALI is insufficiently captured by industry insiders. 
Quel dommage.”); Mark McKenna (@markpmckenna), TWITTER (Dec. 5, 2019, 1:54 PM EST), 
https://twitter.com/markpmckenna/status/1202662535033507841 (“[T]hat’s why opposition without 
seeing the drafts seems clearly ideological. The rest of what you say (deep disagreement, etc) doesn’t 
distinguish copyright from other areas, like, say, torts.”); Brandon Butler (@bc_butler), TWITTER (Dec. 
5, 2019, 7:38 AM EST), https://twitter.com/bc_butler/status/1202567936034136064 (“The copyright 
rent-seeker lobby’s anxiety over the Restatement should be seen for what it is:  an expression of sheer 
terror that copyright will be authoritatively explained by experts who have never been and will never be 
on their payroll.”); cf. Brandon Butler (@bc_butler), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2019, 10:12 AM EST), 
https://twitter.com/bc_butler/status/1204056189643841537 (sarcastically stating that “[w]e can’t have a 
Restatement of Copyright because the professionals at the Copyright Office are the only people we can 
trust to give an unbiased, expert explanation of—oh”). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
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based in common law.14  These previous Restatements helped guide interstate 
practice and coordinate legal development across the fifty states.  The 1976 
Copyright Act, the principal federal statute governing copyright law, may be a single 
federal statute for the whole nation, but its development over forty years by courts in 
thirteen separate circuits through thousands upon thousands of cases has not always 
been uniform or crystal clear.  The 1976 Copyright Act both draws on longstanding 
common law elucidated by federal courts and uses language indicating Congress 
intended for courts to continue expounding the common law in essential ways.15  
Moreover, as Congress intimated when it enacted the 1976 Act, it was enacting a 
copyright statute for the ages.  In four decades, Congress has not returned to revise 
the central aspects of the law to which the ALI Restatement of Copyright Law now 
turns its attention.  This confirms that it was intended for long-range judicial 
interpretation subject to complex and diverse doctrinal evolution.  For these reasons, 
we should welcome a carefully crafted Restatement of Copyright Law to help courts 
and lawyers ascertain the central rules of copyright law as they have evolved over 
the past forty years. 
The provisions at issue in the draft Restatement of Copyright Law on which ALI 
membership will vote at ALI’s upcoming annual meeting are central to copyright 
doctrine and have been the subject of numerous court decisions over the past several 
decades of technological and industry change:  originality, fixation, categories of 
copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and authorship and 
ownership.16  This abundance of legal activity on copyright law demonstrates the 
value to the profession of this project retelling copyright.  In contrast to the dramatic 
criticism of this Restatement project alleging political capture or illegitimate law 
reform, the draft’s provisions are routine and straightforward.  They will surprise no 
one and are almost boring in their adherence to and synthesis of the copyright statute 
and judicial interpretations of it.  Far from being radical or ill-advised, the 
Restatement of Copyright Law is a reasonable and welcome addition to the work of 
the ALI.  
Part I of this Article situates the current Restatement of Copyright Law in the 
historical context of other ALI projects, drawing parallels in their purposes, 
processes, and political tensions.  Part II describes the controversy over a “retelling” 
of copyright law as misguided insofar as it fails to account for the practice of 
interpretation as part of the practice of law that is constrained by professional 
standards.  Part III describes the analysis and exposition of the provisions of the draft 
portions of the Restatement of Copyright Law presented to the ALI membership for 
discussion and vote this year as unremarkable but also beneficial, achieving the 
ALI’s goals of clarification and simplification of the sprawling federal case law 
interpreting and applying the 1976 Copyright Act. 
 
 
 14. As described in Part I in more detail, not all ALI projects are restatements based in common 
law, however. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, COPYRIGHT (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 8, 2020) 
[hereinafter Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020)]. 
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I. THE PROJECT OF RESTATEMENTS 
The ALI’s history and structure have been described in numerous articles.17  
Notable among these histories is a debate about whether the ALI’s purpose is 
properly understood as describing the law or proposing reform.  As summarized 
below, this debate began with the ALI’s origins.  The initial “‘pragmatic reformist’ 
drive of [its] founders” remains a critical feature of the ALI and an enduring source 
of tension.18  Other controversies surrounding ALI projects over the course of the 
twentieth century relate to this tension, and some are simply the product of an 
evolving and growing membership organization whose structure is intentionally 
deliberative and democratic.  The tensions endemic to democratic institutions—
charges of hierarchy and elitism, problems of exclusivity and lack of diversity, and 
the scope and substance of the public interest—have plagued the ALI over the 
decades.  The Restatement of Copyright Law project may therefore produce similar 
tensions, but they arise because of the nature of the ALI, not because of the nature of 
copyright law. 
The ALI explains its mission as “the clarification and simplification of the law 
and its better adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration 
of justice.”19  This mission dates back to 1906, when the idea of the ALI was first 
proposed, well before it was founded in 1923.20  As described in a critical history of 
the ALI, the ALI originated from a struggle circa 1906 between the American Bar 
Association (ABA) member lawyers and the American Association of Law Schools 
(AALS) member law professors.21  The disagreement was not over the necessity of 
an organization devoted to clarifying the sprawling terrain of judicial decisions.  That 
important purpose was understood and accepted.  Rather, it was over the nature of 
law that was to be clarified.  Today, we recall this debate as the beginning of the 
jurisprudential shift from legal formalism to legal realism; but, at the time, the 
disagreements were personal and described as pitting an “old guard” of 
“conservative” practitioners against “progressive-minded,” “younger men.”22 
The leader of the “progressive-minded” lawyers was thirty-eight-year-old Roscoe 
Pound, then dean of University of Nebraska Law School.  When Pound gave a speech 
at an ABA meeting in 1906 criticizing the growing imprecision of legal decision-
making, he pleaded for law to be more responsive to the evolution of social and 
economic life.23  The growing inconsistencies among legal decisions across the 
 
 17. Some notable histories include Alex Elson, The Case for an In-Depth Study of the American 
Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQ. 625 (1998); N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform:  A New Perspective 
on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55 (1990); see also John P. Frank, The 
American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615 (1998). 
 18. Elson, supra note 17, at 627; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, The Political Economy 
of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1995) (critiquing the ALI and National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as private legislatures despite the fact that, according to the 
authors, politics should not influence either organization). 
 19. See How the Institute Works, supra note 1. 
 20. Hull, supra note 17, at 56. 
 21. Id. at 56–58. 
 22. Id. at 57–58. 
 23. Id. at 56–57. 
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country were as much a result of legal formalism’s rigidity as they were a function 
of the vast accumulation of cases across diverse populations and rapidly changing 
circumstances of modern industrialism at the turn of the century.24  Pound’s speech 
was ill-received at the ABA, but several law professors in attendance were energized 
and saw an opportunity “to do something about it in [their] own limited spheres.”25  
Accompanying Pound on this mission was John Henry Wigmore (dean of 
Northwestern Law School), William Draper Lewis (founding dean of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School and director of the ALI from its founding to 1947), and 
George Boke of the University of California at Berkeley.26  Their initial plan in 1906 
eventually came to fruition after much consternation and compromise in 1923. 
The years spanning 1906 to 1923 were full of tensions reflecting the ALI’s 
original and enduring purpose.  Though the skirmishes do not need detailed 
recounting here, in general they concerned the evolving role of law schools in 
training lawyers for practice or as scholars in jurisprudence and legal history.27  
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld of Yale Law School was at the center of this debate.  As 
recounted by one historian, “[t]he essence of [Hohfeld’s] plan was the new-found 
self-importance of the legal academic. . . . [He] complained, ‘the majority of the 
universities have . . . been content to offer purely professional or vocational courses 
in law along conventional lines—what is commonly called general jurisprudence 
being entirely, or almost entirely, ignored.”28  Hohfeld’s idea was that some law 
schools would provide the research and theory on which better understanding of the 
law and suggestions for its reform could rely.  This proposal led to debates with the 
AALS that were tinged with, among other things, not-so-subtle classism, racism, and 
xenophobia that threatened less prestigious law schools and those with night 
programs aimed at first-generation students with second-class status.29  The reform 
effort to establish a law institute that could improve an understanding of the law and 
advance the administration of justice reproduced within law schools many of the 
destructive social and political hierarchies outside the profession and in society at 
large.30 
World War I interrupted the debate and, at the war’s end, resulted in compromise.  
The ALI would be independent from law schools; but it would be comprised of 
members from the legal academy who had time to devote to the project, as well as 
judges and practicing lawyers who would add professional legitimacy to the 
project.31  The leaders of this compromise were Elihu Root, Secretary of State under 
Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Gilmore, professor of law at University of 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 58. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 70–72. 
 28. Id. at 59. 
 29. Id. at 63. 
 30. Cf. Richard Yeselson, The Return of the 1920s, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/SWC8-NKYF (comparing polarization of the 2010s to that of the 1920s after a period of 
rapid industrialization, restructuring of labor and professions, and drastic increase in wealth inequality). 
 31. Hull, supra note 17, at 72. 
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Wisconsin Law School and president of the AALS.32  The story is more complicated 
and involves an inspiring speech at an annual AALS meeting by then-New York 
Court of Appeals Judge Benjamin Cardozo, who “persuasively represented the 
perspective of a working judge [and] the desire by judges themselves for the 
clarification and reform of the law now contemplated by the law professors.”33  
Ultimately, compromise occurred, and when the ALI was founded in 1923, it had 
evolved into “an active, independent organization of law professors, lawyers, and 
judges dedicated to progressive law reform.”34 
While the First Restatement project cautiously reflected this compromise with a 
“dogmatic affirmation” of black letter law, the subsequent Second Restatement 
project reflected the maturity of ALI’s purpose.35  It contained more exposition and 
analysis and was geared more toward elucidating majority and minority views and 
recommending an optimal path.36  Herbert Wechsler, the director of the ALI at mid-
century for the Second Restatement project, “took a more active reformist position,” 
asserting “that what courts do in a given situation cannot be divorced from the view 
of what they ought to do.”37 
The ALI’s goal all along was “reform,” but what that means has evolved.  It 
started as clarification and harmonization by reflecting more everyday and 
particularized experience instead of adhering to abstract principles.  Intermittent 
skirmishes during the twentieth century over the ALI’s elitism and exclusivity, 
present at its beginning and continuing throughout the century, ignited further 
debates over the meaning of reform by asking “reform for whom?”  By the mid- to 
late-twentieth century, characteristic controversies concerned special-interest 
lobbying, member-client conflicts, and political preferences of member factions.38  
These debates were about, for example:  whether ALI lawyer members do in fact 
“leave their clients at the door”39; whether membership is appropriately intellectually 
diverse and informed by expertise beyond law (such as in economics and urban 
policy)40; and whether membership was sufficiently representative of the bar as a 
whole.41  Studies of the ALI recount special-interest lobbying of members by specific 
 
 32. Id. at 74. 
 33. Id. at 73. 
 34. Id. at 69. 
 35. Elson, supra note 17, at 628. 
 36. Id.; see also Bennet Boskey, The American Law Institute:  A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 GREEN 
BAG 2d, at 255, 257 (2009). 
 37. Elson, supra note 17, at 628. 
 38. Id. at 629. 
 39. AM LAW INST., COUNCIL R. 9.04 (“To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful, 
disinterested analysis of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door.  Members 
should speak and vote on the basis of their personal and professional convictions and experience without 
regard to client interests or self-interest.”); see also Lawrence J. Fox, Leave Your Clients at the Door, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 608 (1998) (describing special-interest lobbying of members by insurance 
company clients with reference to the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers); Charles W. Wolfram, 
Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV 817, 821–28 (1998) (recounting 
the same). 
 40. Elson, supra note 17, at 633. 
 41. Id. 
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industries (such as insurance), especially with regard to corporate governance, 
products liability, and the law of lawyers.42  These controversies were largely 
resolved with rule changes clarifying the ALI’s mission to serve the public interest, 
by enlarging its membership to include legal academics with specific expertise, and 
by reaffirming adherence to professional standards of the independent “lawyer 
statesman.”43  To be sure, these standards may weaken as time goes on.44  And as the 
ALI grows in size, while it may be more diverse along relevant qualities (including 
subject-matter expertise, geography, ethnicity, gender, professional experience, and 
affiliation), it also may become more unwieldy, generating more contestation and 
disagreement. 
Today, the ALI has over 3,500 members with an elaborate and layered process 
for drafting, revising, and approving Restatements.45  The size and complexity of this 
process have led critics to ask whether it produces effective collaboration and 
deliberation.46  Others have suggested that the ALI is in essence a private legislature, 
but without the error correction and accountability mechanisms legislative processes 
assure.47  Both of these criticisms challenge the core mission of the ALI to provide 
clarifying and accurate legal expertise on which judges and lawyers may rely.  But 
these problems are endemic to any influential and expert organization grounded in 
principles of diversity and professionalism that continues to grow in size, not to the 
ALI specifically.  And, although it may be true that the ALI is not accountable to its 
constituents the way legislatures are, there is no reason to believe that the ALI’s 
members—and the Reporters and Advisors doing the lion’s share of the drafting 
work—are not as good (or bad) as legislators at finding facts and collecting empirical 
data useful for analyzing and expounding the law.  Moreover, the transparency of the 
ALI process and its layers of membership review provide meaningful measures of 
accountability and create ample information with which to evaluate the merits of the 
final product on which the ALI’s reputation and authority depend.  After all, a 
Restatement is not binding on courts or legislatures.48  Its persuasiveness resides in 
the quality of its procedural layers of review and the rigor, expertise, and 
professionalism of its members. 
The ALI’s success over the years has led to its expansion beyond Restatements to 
the development of Principles and Model Codes.  These have included influential 
projects such as the Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code, Model Code 
of Evidence, and less successful ones such as recommendations for improving 
federal tax and securities law.49  These projects are addressed to legislatures and 
 
 42. Id. at 626; see also Fox, supra note 39, at 608. 
 43. Elson, supra note 17, at 630. 
 44. As one author writes, “[p]rofessionalism has yielded to commercialization and marketing and 
denigration of public service, akin to some business enterprises.”  Id. at 631. 
 45. See How the Institute Works, supra note 1; Elson, supra note 17, at 633–34 (describing the 
ALI’s process). 
 46. Elson, supra note 17, at 634. 
 47. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 18, at 22. 
 48. Arthur Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute, 15 IOWA 
L. REV. 19, 36, 39 (1929). 
 49. Boskey, supra note 36, at 258–59; Elson, supra note 17, at 628. 
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governmental agencies and take the form of explicit recommendations for statutory 
language or guiding principles for statutory enactments;50 they are not Restatements 
or expositions of existing cases.  In the context of all of these efforts, the Restatement 
of Copyright Law is but one of many projects aimed at clarifying and explaining the 
increasingly complex and numerous court decisions, in this case about copyright law, 
to aid practitioners in its application to particular circumstances.  Whether the 
Restatement of Copyright Law will be widely adopted by practitioners, as have other 
ALI Restatement projects, remains to be seen.  That it should be attempted and that 
it is within the ALI’s mandate is, to us, without a doubt.  What then generates 
controversy about this Restatement project?51 
II. THE INEVITABILITY OF RETELLING THE LAW 
 The act of restating in the manner that is the ALI’s signature form is consistent 
with the practice of law generally, which inevitably involves acts of legal exposition 
and interpretation.  Stating the law and saying what it means, and then applying it in 
a particular context, are what lawyers and judges do all the time.  In this way, 
restating—or “retelling”—the law is both normal and inevitable, even though 
copyright law is based in a federal statute. 
To be sure, sometimes restating the law may be difficult and fraught with 
controversy.  For example, typical difficulties of interpretation arise in the context of 
linguistic ambiguity, distances in time and changes of circumstances, and complex 
or contradictory historical textual origins.52  Who renders the interpretation may also 
raise concerns of subjectivity and the influence of moral or political standards, as 
opposed to technical and professional ones.53  This was evident in earlier disputes 
among ALI members about other projects.54  These controversies over interpretation 
are not new in the ALI or in law generally, and lawyers and judges learn to negotiate 
them as part of law’s practice.  Like many related disciplines such as history, religion, 
and literature, law requires interpretation, and the act of engaging in it is part of its 
authoritative endeavor.55  The ALI’s Restatement of Copyright Law project is just 
an extension of what it means to engage in the practice of law. 
 
 50. Elson, supra note 17, at 629 (describing the Principles of Corporate Governance Project as 
stated by Ray Garrett Jr., the first chief reporter of the project); How the Institute Works, supra note 1. 
 51.  See supra text accompanying notes 5–11 (summarizing the controversy over this project). 
 52. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–13 (1999) (asking these questions regarding constitutional 
law). 
 53. See GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 160 (2000) 
(“Interpretation is objective . . . as long as individual interpreters do not interpret as they wish.”). 
 54. Fox, supra note 39, at 608 (discussing accusations of bias and special-interest lobbying in the 
process of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers). 
 55. Producing and assessing many versions of what the law is or how it should be applied in a 
particular circumstance is essential to law’s legitimacy as an essential socio-political institution.  See, e.g., 
PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:  STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 15–
20 (1988) (explaining how the inevitability of contrasting accounts of law’s fit and function is essential to 
its durability). 
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A. THE RESTATEMENT’S PRECURSORS:  STARE DECISIS AND TREATISES 
Law’s persistence in society as a source of order and control requires law’s 
retelling by judges and lawyers and by legally adjacent professionals such as law 
enforcement officers, human resource professionals, and tax accountants.  In other 
words, law’s retelling is central to the rule of law, which is the principle that legal 
subjects be treated as equals, reasonably, and not arbitrarily.  In order to determine 
if the law as decreed is fair and reliable, it must be restated publicly so legal subjects 
have the “opportunity to make arguments about the application of legal rules to their 
circumstances [and] the public at large may observe these reasons and the arguments 
about them.”56  As Paul Gowder writes: 
The heart of this conception of the rule of law is responsiveness to reasons.  The . . .  
rule of law treats people with respect, as minimally capable of responding to reasons 
given them by preexisting rules that govern their behavior, while also restricting those 
officials who wield coercive power to acting in accordance with those reasons, rather 
than simply their own wills.  Moreover, they directly recruit the capacity of ordinary 
people to reason about reasons by making the use of state force against them conditional 
on their having an opportunity to publicly contest and deploy the reasons given by 
law. . . . The form of a reason is the opposite of arbitrariness. . . . [T]he official who is 
bound to legal reasons at least has to be able to say something that is comprehensible 
to the person over whom power is exercised.  In doing so, that official treats the other 
like an adult, and an equal.57 
Law’s public retelling comes in several forms, officially from the state and 
unofficially through non-state actors.  Before considering the Restatement of 
Copyright Law, we concern ourselves with some of the most common official and 
unofficial forms—judicial opinions and legal treatises—both of which are precursors 
to ALI’s Restatements of Law.  
Judicial opinions need no explanation, except to say that they accomplish through 
the process of stare decisis the strengthening of the rule of law through redundancy 
about and feedback on the rules of law themselves.58  Understood through the frame 
of communications theory, Martin Shapiro describes stare decisis as a form of 
“incremental modes of decision-making” containing “extremely high levels of 
redundancy in the communications linking the decision-making units.”59  He says 
further that “the characteristic style of Anglo-American legal discourse persists [as 
a] . . . rather standard and routine solution to the noise problem of a non-hierarchical 
organization like the courts.”60  Restating the law and the process of stare decisis 
maintain order and authority for the rules within a community of diverse actors.  
Relying on similar concepts, the U.S. Supreme Court frequently expounds the 
importance and centrality of stare decisis to the rule of law.  In milestone cases facing 
a call to overrule past decisions, the Supreme Court explains that cases must be 
 
 56. PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 7 (2016). 
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of ‘Stare Decisis’, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 127, 129 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 127, 132. 
 60. Id. at 134. 
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decided in light of previous ones to avoid arbitrariness and that compelling reasons 
must be provided to depart from precedent.  Predictability, stability, and equal 
application of rules are critical to the Court’s own legitimacy.  In its most 
contemporary extended disquisition on stare decisis, in Planned Parenthood of 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court explained:  “[W]e recognize that no judicial system 
could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.  
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires 
such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, 
indispensable.”61  In Casey, the Court outlined several bases for departing from 
precedent—unworkability, erosion, lack of reliance, and changed factual 
conditions—together which amount to articulating persuasive and substantial 
reasons for departing from the established legal rule while also upholding the rule of 
law.62  The usual practice of law and reasons for its efficacy include consistent and 
transparent reaffirmation of the rules (the precedents) through their repetition 
(restatement and application) by courts and lawyers.  
Unlike judicial opinions, treatises do not have the force of law and they do not 
serve as precedential authority for courts.  At best, they are persuasive authority.  
They are nonetheless indispensable to judicial decision-making and the rule of law 
because they provide information about consistent patterns and outliers in legal 
precedent on which courts often rely.  The legal treatise has a centuries-long pedigree 
that grew out of “the abridgment tradition.”63  As A.W.B. Simpson explains: 
The collapse in the seventeenth century of the collective exercises of learning in the 
Inns [of Court], the increase in the size of the legal profession, and the proliferation of 
nonauthoritative printed texts, could only lend support to the suggestion that the 
common law was no more than an ungodly jumble . . . . One reaction to all this had 
been practical.  From the fifteenth century onwards lawyers had been attempting to 
reduce the unwieldy mass of legal materials, sometimes for their own personal use and 
sometimes cooperatively, by digesting it under titles arranged, for the want of any better 
system, alphabetically.  This generated the abridgments and common-place books, 
which remained dominant forms of legal literature until the nineteenth century.  The 
systematizing efforts of the compilers of abridgments could make possible the 
production of treatise literature based upon an analysis of the material abridged.64 
The “great” treatises would not be written until the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  These include William Blackstone’s Commentaries in England65 and 
Joseph Story’s series of nine treatises in the United States.66  The U.S. tradition 
culminated in the twentieth century with John Henry Wigmore’s treatise on evidence, 
 
 61. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
149 (1921); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16 
(1991)).  Note the reference in this description of stare decisis to Cardozo, who was instrumental in 
facilitating the founding of the ALI. 
 62. Id. 
 63. A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise:  Legal Principles and the Forms of 
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 638 (1981). 
 64. Id. at 639. 
 65. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765–69). 
 66. Simpson, supra note 63, at 670 (citing all nine). 
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Samuel Williston’s and Arthur Corbin’s treatises on contracts, and Austin W. Scott’s 
on trusts.67 
As this brief history makes clear, treatises are generally authored by a single 
person (although, to be sure, authors usually have administrative and research help).  
This means treatises are liable to have character and take positions.68  But, as 
Simpson writes, “early American legal writers were anxious to demonstrate that the 
enterprise in which they were engaged, the exposition of the American common law, 
was a respectable one.”69  At their best, treatises of this genre “unfold the rules, the 
principles, the reasons, which not only governed former decisions, but are to govern 
subsequent ones.”70  They categorize and order their legal subject to help courts 
decide cases.  This endeavor becomes especially helpful when no binding authority 
exists on the issue in the relevant jurisdiction but cases on point exist in other 
jurisdictions that may be unfamiliar or hard to find.71  Treatises also often summarize 
and highlight the patterns and themes in cases based on similar or contrasting 
statutory language and public policy, which may be relevant to the issues before a 
court.72  And treatises provide historical perspectives of changes over time and trends 
in the case law that courts sitting in singular jurisdictions may seek to understand 
when deciding cutting-edge legal issues.73  The treatise’s biggest limitation—its 
singular titular author—is addressed by two of its enduring features:  the reputation 
of the author (many of whom have been esteemed lawyers or law professors) and its 
erudition.74  As Joseph Story explained in his preface to the Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence, demonstrating deep and thorough knowledge of the field:  “In many 
cases I have endeavoured to show the reasons, upon which these doctrines are 
founded, and to illustrate them by principles drawn from foreign jurisprudence, as 
well as from the Roman Civil Law.”75  
According to treatise historians, the Restatement and uniform legislation projects 
are “the most recent expressions of this natural evolution” of a retelling or 
 
 67. Id. at 674 (citing these treatises).  Wigmore and Corbin were also leaders in ALI Restatement 
projects. 
 68. For critiques on these grounds of the leading copyright treatises and an argument that a 
Restatement of Copyright Law is a superior legal resource, see Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright 
Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 457 (2014); Ann Bartow, The 
Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004). 
 69. Simpson, supra note 63, at 671. 
 70. Id. at 674 (quoting JOEL PRENTICE BISHOP, THE FIRST BOOK OF THE LAW (1868)). 
 71. Richard Danner, Oh, the Treatise!, 111 MICH. L. REV. 821, 829 (2013) (“[T]he precedent-
based, multijurisdictional U.S. system ‘was inherently costly to work with.  It required time-taking search 
for authorities.’” (quoting JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:  THE LAW 
MAKERS 308 (1950)); see also id. at 833 (describing how treatises “helped harried lawyers make sense of 
the raw materials . . . [and] provided context and structure to the flood of published cases”). 
 72. Id. at 824–25. 
 73. Id. at 826–28. 
 74. Most treatise authors have administrative and editorial help, as mentioned above, supra text 
accompanying note 68, but this does not affect the evaluation of the treatise’s authorship as emanating 
from a single source. 
 75. Simpson, supra note 63, at 673 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, at iv (1836)). 
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summarizing of the law.76  Restatements of law rely on stare decisis and share 
characteristics with legal treatises, including their purpose of summary, 
categorization, and bringing order to an unwieldy common law.  Restatements do 
not, however, have the singular author limitation of treatises.  And so, drafted by 
committee and subjected to multi-layers of approval processes, one might think a 
Restatement even more reliable than a legal treatise. 
In the case of the Restatement of Copyright Law, questions have been raised about 
its legitimacy in light of its statutory context.77  But why should that be so?  As the 
following Section explains in more detail, a statute is no less in need of interpretation 
than the common law.  To be sure, the historical focus of most Restatement projects 
has been state law with the stated aim of coordinating legal practice in light of more 
than fifty distinct jurisdictions.78  This helped facilitate the interstate practice of law.  
By design, federal law does not present a coordination problem of the same 
magnitude.  But that does not render a Restatement of Copyright Law illegitimate.  
Federal circuit courts generate circuit splits that are rarely clarified by the U.S. 
Supreme Court with its dwindling docket.79  Even in the absence of splits of 
authority, as Part III discusses, the current federal statutes have generated more than 
tens of thousands of federal court decisions that have left copyright law cluttered and 
in need of coordination.80  And, as the following Part also describes in more detail, 
the application of central copyright doctrines relies on state law.81  Restating those 
doctrines in light of the variation around the nation is useful to achieve the ALI’s 
mission of promoting “the clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs . . . [and] to secure the better administration of justice.”82 
The 1976 Copyright Act’s retelling in a Restatement as part of its interpretation 
and application for future uses is both inevitable and essential because of its statutory 
nature:  the generality of the Act’s language;83 the change in time and circumstances 
since its inception;84 and copious judicial copyright precedent, especially since the 
digital age, that has rendered copyright law more relevant than ever before.85  Each 
of these factors explains (and may justify) diverse statutory interpretations and 
 
 76. Id. at 675. 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11. 
 78. See Past and Present ALI Projects, AM. L. INST. (Dec. 2020), https://perma.cc/S5C3-SV8N 
(listing all ALI projects past and present). 
 79. Ryan J. Owens &  David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1219, 1242 (2012). 
 80. See infra Part III. 
 81. See infra Part III. 
 82. How the Institute Works, supra note 1. 
 83. As Part III discusses in more detail, phrases such as “works of authorship” and “transitory 
duration” are at the center of current copyright debates and subject to contested interpretations.  As Part 
III explains, in some instances and as is common with statutory drafting, the 1976 Copyright Act 
intentionally includes ambiguous and broad language in order to be adaptable and flexible. 
 84. The 1976 Act is now forty-five years old and predates the age of the personal computer and the 
internet era.  The substantiality of technological, social, and economic changes in copyright industries 
since 1976 cannot be overstated. 
 85. See Jessica Silbey, Against Progress:  Interventions About Equality in Supreme Court Cases 
About Copyright Law, 19 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 280, 280–81 (2020) (describing the rise of 
intellectual property cases and the field’s increasing relevance to everyday life in the twenty-first century). 
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applications, which collect over time into a mass of “copyright law”—a veritable 
common law of copyright, undoubtedly grounded in the 1976 Copyright Act—in 
need of “clarification and simplification.”  These inevitable features of legal 
evolution may produce doctrinal ambiguity and conflict, which the Restatement of 
Copyright Law can highlight as doctrinal strands on which legal arguments may be 
based.  This does not amount to legislating copyright but instead is the kind of 
exposition and clarification that have been hallmarks of past ALI projects.86 
B. THE RESTATEMENT AS UNREMARKABLE LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
We concede that statutory law may be interpreted in a different manner than the 
common law within legitimate legal customs and practices.87  But to us, this means 
only that one must justify the method of exposition and interpretation, not the fact of 
it.  This raises the concern already mentioned in Part I about institutional legitimacy 
and membership, an enduring tension across ALI projects and not specific to this 
one.  Once we concede that statutes need retelling—perhaps especially the 1976 
Copyright Act88—under what circumstances is the retelling legitimate, and by 
whom?  This raises age-old questions (in law, as well as in history, religion, and 
literature) about clarifying constraints on interpretation to render legitimate the 
“restatement” of the subject text by the restatement authors. 
Interpretation does not render the text unstable.  Decades of debates within literary 
criticism make that clear.  When Stanley Fish asked in 1982, “Is there a text in this 
class?,” he did not mean to render unstable all texts and illegitimate their 
interpretations (although some certainly accused him of that).89  His reader-response 
theory of literary interpretation was a culmination of decades of literary history and 
theory debating the proper disciplinary constraints for reading and retelling of 
literature.  Could the meaning of a text be found in its words alone?  How does the 
history of its words dictate their meaning?  Will knowing the writer’s biography 
facilitate interpretation of her words?  How do the imagined or real readers of the 
words at the time of writing (or later upon reading) determine the text’s meaning?  
 
 86. One might argue that the Restatement of Copyright Law should not address statutory 
ambiguities, as any gaps or lack of clarity can be fixed by Congress alone.  For the reasons stated in Part 
II.B, such an argument mistakenly leaves to the legislative branch a significant job for most lawyers:  
interpreting and applying ambiguous statutory provisions in light of new circumstances.  Furthermore, the 
legislative branch is typically slow to respond to statutory ambiguities and gaps and usually does so only 
after lawyers and courts have addressed the issues in practice over time.  Waiting for Congress to address 
statutory ambiguities hurts litigants and the administration of justice and is contrary to the ALI’s mission.  
It also bears emphasizing that a Restatement of Copyright Law is not the Copyright Act.  If Congress 
wants to fill a gap or clarify a statutory ambiguity, Congress can do that.  And if Congress wants to avoid 
legislating, it can do that too.  But one institution’s delay or avoidance should not be the reason for 
another’s, especially when the ALI is not making law and is merely restating it to facilitate others’ 
administration of it.  Finally, the fact that Congress may amend the law (or not) does not make a 
Restatement futile.  It merely emphasizes law’s unfinished and essentially open character. 
 87. LIEF CARTER & THOMAS BURKE, REASON IN LAW 68–101 (7th ed. 2004) (describing and 
distinguishing statutory interpretation from common-law development). 
 88. See infra Part III. 
 89. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?:  THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES 305 (1980). 
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As Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg explain, “Fish initially set out to establish 
reader-centered criticism as a more objective rival to the text-centered New 
Criticism.  Thus, his initial response to the proliferation of conflicting ‘close 
readings’ was not to celebrate the creativity of the interpreter, but to seek to better 
constrain the interpreter.”90  They further explain that Fish’s “method of doing so 
was to . . . focus[] on the role of the reader expectations in structuring the reading 
experience.”91  Fish demanded we investigate the “social practice of reading” in 
order to identify a shared “system of rules that each [reader] . . . has somehow 
internalized” rendering “understanding [of the text] . . . in some sense . . . uniform.”92  
This account of literary interpretation was radical if only because it extended and 
diversified the origin of authority for meaning beyond the author and the text.  In this 
way, its result was more democratic if perhaps also more stochastic.  And this 
generated understandable critiques that focused on whether Fish could deliver on his 
theory, whether he was making empirical claims about all readers or just some 
readers (or even just one reader), and whether uniformity plausibly exists even 
among so-called “interpretive communities” that shared reading experiences and 
contexts.93  These were trenchant critiques of Fish’s theory of interpretation, which 
produced refinements and focus, as reasoned and open debate often does.94  
A “new pragmatism” arose in literary theory that drew on, among other features, 
textual genre and genre’s role in constraining the reader’s interpretation (including 
by asking genre-specific questions, such as whether something is a poem or a 
recipe).95  This had the benefit of retaining the importance of the author’s intent but 
also of incorporating the reaction of an expected audience, whose composition will 
change over time alongside the evolution of the genre’s contours.  Genre is a social 
and institutional category as much as a literary one, defining a relationship between 
text and audience based on expectations conventionally assigned to words and 
textual form in a specific situation.96  
What does all this have to do with the Restatement of Copyright Law?  A statute, 
like a recipe or a poem, is a genre of text.97  As such, it calls out to be read in a 
specific way, and lawyers and judges (the text’s typical readers) understand it in this 
fashion.98  Lawyers and judges expect that in the statutory context legislatures are 
the “authors” and that it is the lawyers’ and judges’ task to give meaning to the 
legislature’s policy choices as embodied in the statutory text and structure.99  But it 
is not that simple.  This task definition begs the question of how to “give meaning” 
 
 90. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 140. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 140–44. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 152–54. 
 96. THOMAS BEEBEE, THE IDEOLOGY OF GENRE:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GENERIC 
INSTABILITY 17–27 (1994) (explaining the inevitability of genre as a discursive mediation that is 
inherently unstable). 
 97. Id. at Chapter Five. 
 98. Id. 
 99. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 69. 
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to the text as an expression of policy preferences.  As Lief Carter and Thomas Burke 
write, “[j]udges who arm themselves with dictionaries and expect to find a single, 
unproblematic interpretation of a statute expect too much of language—and too little 
of themselves.”100  The 1976 Copyright Act is no exception.  It contains some very 
specific provisions (such as the exemptions of certain performances and displays 
from copyright infringement in § 110101) and also uses broad, general language (such 
as the subject matter of copyright in § 102102).  Communities of readers must 
interpret words in the statutory context and attend to evolving factual circumstances.  
Given a statute’s complexity and variable relevance in diverse contexts, its 
interpretation is likely to generate diverse results. 
Statutes are also more than words.  They are complex, multi-layered texts 
produced over time in the context of committee reports, floor speeches, and 
testimony.  The 1976 Copyright Act in particular was written over the course of more 
than a decade of stakeholder convenings and public hearings with explicit but 
broadly worded compromises baked into the statute.103  The industries on whose 
behalf those compromises were struck, such as the book publishing, music, and 
computer industries, have been so transformed in the digital age that a judge or 
lawyer would be forgiven for struggling to interpret and apply statutory provisions 
drafted for industries that would be unrecognizable today.104  And yet, they do apply 
the statute to new circumstances because that is their job.105  The “interpretive 
communities” of judges and lawyers are relatively coherent in terms of professional 
standards and norms, driven by consistency among legal institutions and education 
(especially as opposed to readers of novels or movie audiences whose diversity is by 
definition as varied as the consuming public).106  And yet, the 1976 Copyright Act 
(like all statutes) is addressed to readers of uncertain size and scope for a period of 
uncertain time.107  Indeed, the authors of the 1976 Copyright Act, writing a “statute 
 
 100. Id. at 107. 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
 102. Id. § 102. 
 103. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35–76 (2001) (providing a history of copyright 
lawmaking in the twentieth century). 
 104. The music industry—with its transformed distribution and production mechanisms—is only 
one such example.  The Music Modernization Act of 2019 was one attempt at updating the Copyright Act 
in light of these changes.  Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.).  The Copyright Office describes it as “the most significant piece of copyright legislation in 
decades and updates our current laws to reflect modern consumer preferences and technological 
developments in the music marketplace.”  The Music Modernization Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
https://perma.cc/3L9P-66M2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
 105. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (describing the function of the judiciary in the 
process of applying a federal statute, the Judiciary Act of 1789, is to “say what the law is”). 
 106. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 10–13. 
 107. See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 149 (“The texts of greatest interest to hermeneutic 
theorists—literary, scriptural, and legal texts—are all addressed to groups of readers of uncertain scope.  
In discussing legal texts such as legislation, [literary theorist E.D.] Hirsch admits that their authors may 
intend to delegate discretion to unknown later interpreters to apply these texts in light of their own 
experience.”). 
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for the ages,” undoubtedly intended to delegate discretion of its interpretation to 
unknown lawyers and judges later in time.108  
What justifies this delegation of interpretation to future “restaters” of the law 
whose interpretations are expected to extend and amplify the statute’s future 
authority?  One answer is the rule of law, as stated above.109  Judges and lawyers are 
disciplined and incentivized to avoid and constrain individual moral feelings in their 
interpretation and application of law.110  Perhaps less like literary critics than Stanley 
Fish would like to admit, lawyers and judges participate in clearly delineated 
interpretive practices defined by constraining features of legal reasoning, such as 
text, precedent, historical record, federalism, and democratic theory.111  Their 
professional reputations are staked on adhering to standards of legal reasoning that 
promote trustworthiness:  transparency, accountability, and evenhandedness.112  
Although lawyers often have obligations to advocate zealously for their clients, 
lawyers and judges nonetheless must justify their interpretation of the law in a 
particular case with reasons resting on impartial grounds mutually agreed upon 
within their community of professional colleagues.113  These include stating facts 
accurately and comprehensively, correcting legal and factual errors when discovered 
and keeping them to a minimum, and justifying choices made among various 
possible legal solutions with established rules of the trade.114  If lawyers and judges 
are perceived to be manipulating or ignoring these rules to reach partisan, self-
interested ends, cohesion in the community and faith in its object of just dispute 
resolution will ebb.115  There is much to incentivize cooperation in upholding the 
rule of law among professionals whose primary task is to interpret or “retell” it.  And 
so, when the legislature relies on future lawyers and judges to retell and apply the 
statute enacted decades prior, they are anticipating an interpretive community 
constrained by these professional standards and goals of maintaining the public good 
of democratic governance.  Why would we expect anything less of the lawyers, 
judges, and scholars crafting the Restatement of Copyright Law today? 
A critic may answer by claiming that this Restatement project has too many law 
professors, and the majority of law professors in the copyright field tend to be of a 
single mind when it comes to copyright reform.  Whether true or not, the criticism 
that legal academia produces too much liberal-leaning scholarship is not a new 
concern.  It was there at the beginning of the ALI, as explained in Part I, and it has 
 
 108. See infra Part III. 
 109. See supra Part II.A. 
 110. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 3. 
 111. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982) (describing 
the six modalities of interpretation as historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical 
arguments). 
 112. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 136–37; id. at 140 (describing the need for “neutral, 
dispassionate . . . dispute resol[ution] [as being] greatest when disputes are most intense and when the 
legal decision will have a major impact on the lives of many people”). 
 113. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982) (describing 
how judicial and other authoritative interpreters of law are constrained by the norms of their communities 
of interpretation); see also BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 160–61 (describing Fiss’s work). 
 114. CARTER & BURKE, supra note 87, at 142–50. 
 115. Id. 
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not derailed past Restatement projects.  And whether copyright law professors in 
particular are somehow more partisan than the other legal scholars (a claim we 
dispute but accept for the purpose of argument here), the Restatement community is 
much more than law professors.  In addition to legal scholars from all over the nation, 
Advisors, Liaisons, and Members Consultative Group to the project include 
copyright-industry lawyers who work both in-house and at law firms, judges, and 
professional organization leaders.116  The prefatory pages to the Tentative Draft No. 
1 list affiliations as diverse as the field.117  And even if the concern is of these 
Reporters specifically—and we do not know that it is—these Reporters, just like 
those from projects before, promise to avoid or disclose all conflicts of interest and 
adhere to professional legal norms of honesty and diligence.118  Legal academics, 
like other lawyers and judges, are committed to the rules of professional conduct that 
include cultivating knowledge of the law, employing that knowledge to reform the 
law and strengthening legal education, and advancing the public’s understanding of 
and confidence in the rule of law and our justice system.119  The ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct also describe lawyers being “guided by personal conscience 
and the approbation of professional peers.”120  We should expect only the “highest 
level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal 
profession’s ideals of public service” in this Restatement project, as with others.121 
If we were to criticize the Restatement project at all as lacking legitimacy of 
democratic engagement and inclusivity, it would be a criticism of the Restatement 
projects generally, not this one specifically.  And this too has been an enduring 
tension in the ALI, as Part I explains.  This speaks to the difference between 
Restatements and other legal authorities.  A Restatement is not a judicial opinion or 
a legal brief; it is not a statute.  If it lacks the breadth of participation we expect from 
the most authoritative of legal sources, that is because it is by its very nature an expert 
perspective constrained by the experts who participate and the process in which the 
opinions are rendered and accepted.  Like legal treatises enthusiastically embraced 
 
 116. Participants, AM. L. INST., https://perma.cc/YSG2-G65K (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).  To be 
sure, the Reporter is the lead on the project and, like most Reporters before him (including Wigmore, 
Scott, and Corbin), he is a law professor.  Christopher Jon Sprigman, NYU LAW, https://perma.cc/8FJE-
KKER (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).  The Reporter’s job as a legal academic cannot reasonably be the basis 
to complain about the Restatement of Copyright Law because most past Reporters were academics and 
were so designated originally because they had more time to devote to the project compared to full-time 
practicing lawyers and judges.  Elson, supra note 17, at 636 (explaining time constraints on practicing 
lawyers). 
 117. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020), at vii–ix. 
 118. Like all ALI members, Reporters must provide “thoughtful, disinterested” analysis and “leave 
their clients at the door,” meaning both actual clients and personal self-interest; the ALI’s own rules 
require as much.  AM LAW INST., COUNCIL R. 4.03 (“To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful, 
disinterested analysis of legal issues, members are expected to leave client interests at the door. . . . 
Members should speak, write, and vote on the basis of their personal and professional convictions and 
experience without regard to client interests or self-interest.”); Policy Statement and Procedures on 
Conflicts of Interest with Respect to Institute Projects, AM. LAW INST. (May 17, 2010) 
https://perma.cc/QM6T-NGEC (citing ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble ¶¶ 2, 4). 
 119. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble ¶ 6. 
 120. Id. ¶ 7. 
 121. Id. 
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by lawyers and judges and cited with frequency,122 the Restatement is one view on 
the state of the law.  It is a collective view—not a singular one—and for that reason, 
maybe it is an improvement on solo-authored treatises.123  But the Restatement 
remains persuasive authority, at best, whose authority is grounded in respect for the 
ALI.  The ALI Restatements are perhaps more persuasive than amicus briefs and 
experts at trial, which are nevertheless encouraged and considered seriously by 
courts.  Restatements are likely to remain welcome and relied upon as long as 
clarification of the law remains necessary and the ALI remains a reputable 
professional organization dedicated to the rule of law. 
Movements in literary theory over the twentieth century have focused on the same 
kind of struggle we see over the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act in light of 
institutional legitimacy.  Literary theories of textual interpretation disputed whether 
literary interpretation was more like an objective science or a subjective self-centered 
performance by the critic.124  But to focus on the literary in law is to miss the similar 
and coincident epistemological inquiries among historians, religion scholars, and 
legal professionals.125  These disciplines aim to discern through debate the meaning 
of authoritative texts and have done so for centuries.  Each embraces the process of 
retelling as a feature of disciplinary practice, of knowing history, of understanding 
religion, and of practicing law.  The point is not to avoid retelling, but to explain the 
contingencies of that retelling as a matter of disciplinary consensus that justifies the 
production of knowledge within each specialty.126 
And so we return to the question:  What explains the anxiety about retelling this 
statute?  What prevents a professional consensus from arising regarding the 
contingencies of legal interpretation in the case of the 1976 Copyright Act?  The 
anxiety that a Restatement of Copyright Law will lead to uncertainty, relativism, or 
even political polarization is a comment about the specific nature of this text, the 
state of the copyright industries today, and the community of interpreters.  But these 
are old concerns that arose in earlier ALI endeavors and none justifiably undermines 
this Restatement project. 
As stated above, the statutory genre does not thwart its need for interpretation 
because all statutes require interpretation to be effective.  And as Part III describes, 
this particular statute has certain features making its retelling more necessary, if also 
more challenging.  The distance from the textual writing and its current application 
 
 122. In the copyright field, those treatises include PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3d 
ed. 2020); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2020); and WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT (2020). 
 123. See supra Part II.A. 
 124. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 147. 
 125. See, e.g., JAMES L. KUGEL, HOW TO READ THE BIBLE:  A GUIDE TO SCRIPTURE, THEN AND 
NOW (2012) (discussing and applying ancient and modern biblical interpretive methods); William W. 
Fisher III, Texts and Contexts:  The Application To American Legal History of the Methodologies of 
Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (describing methodological debates of interpretation 
in history).  With regard to constitutional law, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 52. 
 126. For a notable exploration of this issue in the context of religion, see generally JAMES L. KUGEL, 
THE BIBLE AS IT WAS (1997) (explicating how the Bible itself is a retelling of many preexisting religious 
and cultural works). 
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is substantial in the legal context.127  Although lawyers regularly interpret and apply 
constitutions and other laws that are centuries old, the older the texts are, the harder 
and more contestable their interpretations may become.128  The technological, 
economic, and social changes over the half-century since the 1976 Copyright Act 
was passed have made the statute’s contours more relevant and more outdated.129  
Courts all over the country are faced with copyright issues on an increasingly 
frequent basis in light of the internet era and are asked to interpret statutory language 
that speaks of “publication,” “authorship,” and “fixation in a tangible medium” as 
they were put into the statute before the internet.130  Lawyers and judges are doing 
an admirable job wrestling with the 1976 Copyright Act in a twenty-first century 
technological ecosystem, but they are doing it piecemeal, understaffed, and in light 
of a growing diversity of clients.  What we have, then, is a veritable common law of 
copyright since the passage of 1976 Act (and in many cases from before), with 
proliferating decisions at rapid rates.131  And in the absence of a new statute, a 
Restatement can bring order to this body of law, which is exactly the ALI’s 
mission.132  These factors render the stakes of retelling high and the possible 
variations in the retelling large.  But these factors cry out for the need of a 
Restatement, not the avoidance of one. 
And so, we are left with the possibility that the “interpretive community” charged 
with the Restatement of Copyright Law lacks the legitimacy required to render an 
authoritative retelling of the state of copyright law.  And this returns us to “new 
pragmatism” in literary theory, which wrestled with much the same question thirty 
years ago when faced with the unraveling of the field as a university discipline.  
Interpretation is a convention-bound activity in which “interpreters are disciplined 
by community norms . . . to be found in descriptive or prescriptive accounts of the 
institutions within which they read.”133  The source of the illegitimacy is not the fact 
of the retelling but the political context in which the telling is rendered.134  The 
current political context is unfortunately an increasingly ideologically polarized 
nation, dramatic and destabilizing wealth inequality, and enormous threats to the rule 
 
 127. See infra Part III.A. 
 128. WHITTINGTON, supra note 52, at 161 (discussing “intentional fallacy”); id. at 174 (discussing 
originalism as “the end of history”). 
 129. See infra Part III.A. 
 130. See infra Part III. 
 131. See Scott D. Hampton & Ashley J. Bailey, Intellectual Property Case Filing Trends Over the 
Last Decade, HAMPTON IP & ECON. CONSULTING (Feb. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/YQM5-PGN7 
(showing increase by 128% of copyright cases between 2010–2019). 
 132. This does not concede that a Restatement in the statutory context is any less legitimate than in 
the common law context.  But a Restatement here brings order and organization to the cases in the absence 
of another kind of ordering. 
 133. BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 153. 
 134. Id. at 114.  Binder and Weisberg root the crisis of judicial legitimacy to which legal 
hermeneutics responds in the resistance to the interpretation of the Civil War Amendments:  “The 
legitimacy crisis in which American legal scholarship has struggled for the better part of a century 
[regarding constitutional interpretation] . . . [have] roots . . . in enduring cleavages in American society 
and politics, and its challenges are political rather than technical.  If literary theory is to help us meet these 
challenges, it must do so in, and not in place of, politics.”  Id. 
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of law that rival in intensity the decades just after World War I in the United States, 
when the ALI got off the ground.135  Do controversies related to copyright law reflect 
this unsettling political context?  Maybe.136  We can never really separate ourselves 
from the particular time and place in which we are situated.  Law is, after all “a 
practice that constantly appropriates, reproduces, and reshapes a culture.”137  Doing 
law always incorporates materials from the present, precarious moment.  But that 
does not make the practice of law—its interpretation and application—illegitimate.  
As lawyers, we have the capacity to shape and revitalize the very foundations we 
worry are being weakened, the professional standards and norms of legal reasoning, 
factual determinations, and evenhandedness that are the hallmarks of our 
“interpretive community” of lawyers and judges.  The Restatement project has the 
chance to amplify these essential features of the legal profession and speak to the 
central questions of law’s public meaning and value.  And we have every reason to 
believe the Restatement of Copyright Law will do just that. 
In restating the law of copyright for lawyers and judges who seek help organizing 
the complex field, the Restatement project is not wresting power from the 94th 
Congress which passed the 1976 Copyright Act.  The Restatement participants are 
engaging in a broader, civic-minded project that all lawyers and judges engage in by 
asking how to understand this law (the statute) in light of all the other decisions, 
related laws, and constitutions.  As James Boyd White has observed, “[i]n both the 
identification of texts and their construction, then, the lawyer is engaged in the 
special kind of lawmaking that respects certain judgments made by others,” further 
stating that  “[o]ne could hardly imagine a . . . [task] more naturally public and civic 
in its nature, than that . . . in which one constantly gives meaning not only to the 
immediate experience of others but to our shared past and present.”138  Restatement 
participants are trained in the law, committed to the rule of law, and are participating 
in an integrated and democratic process of open debate with people of diverse 
perspectives who are experts in the field.  As such, there is every reason to think a 
Restatement of Copyright Law will be as successful an ALI project as those that 
came before. 
III. COPYRIGHT’S RETELLING 
Retelling copyright law in a Restatement is as natural and useful of an endeavor 
as a Restatement of Contracts or Torts, even if copyright law is grounded in a federal 
statute.  The 1976 Copyright Act, the principal federal statute governing copyright 
law, both draws on longstanding common law elucidated by the courts and signals 
courts to continue expounding the common law in essential ways.  Moreover, as 
 
 135. See supra Part I. 
 136. Silbey, supra note 85 (describing trends in intellectual property cases over the past twenty years 
as being increasingly about deeply rooted but contested values, such as equality, rather than about market 
competition, which is typically the focus of intellectual property). 
 137. BINDER AND WEISBERG, supra note 53, at 27. 
 138. JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE:  ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION 176 (2000). 
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Congress intimated when it enacted the 1976 Act, it was enacting a copyright statute 
for the ages.  That Congress has not returned to revise the central aspects of the law 
in the past four decades strongly suggests that it was intended for long-term judicial 
interpretation.  For these reasons, we should welcome a carefully crafted Restatement 
of Copyright Law to help courts and lawyers ascertain the central rules of copyright 
law.  The provisions at issue in the Restatement of Copyright Law draft on which 
ALI membership will vote at ALI’s upcoming annual meeting—originality, fixation, 
categories of copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, and 
authorship and ownership—exemplify how valuable this project retelling copyright 
is.139 As set out in subsequent sections, these provisions demonstrate the benefits of 
a well-constructed Restatement of Copyright Law. 
A. A STATUTE FOR THE AGES 
As discussed above, some have expressed discomfort with a Restatement of 
Copyright Law, even as they are at ease with Restatements of Contracts and Torts, 
because of the single federal statute at the base of U.S. copyright law.140  For 
example, some members of Congress recently urged that “laws created through 
federal statute, including federal copyright law, are ill-suited for treatment in a 
Restatement because the law is clearly articulated by Congress in both the statute and 
the legislative history.”141  They elaborated that “any Restatement or other treatise 
relied on by courts that attempts to diminish the importance of the statutory text or 
legislative history relating to that text would warrant concern.”142  Furthermore, they 
suggested that “[c]ourts should rely on that statutory text and legislative history, not 
Restatements that attempt to replace the statutory language and legislative history 
established by Congress with novel interpretations.”143 
But the Congress that enacted the 1976 Copyright Act intended and expected 
courts to use common-law decision-making tools to interpret the core of the Act.  The 
fact that copyright law originates from a federal statute does not obviate the need for 
its interpretation, and thus produces proliferating interpretations for reasons already 
discussed above in Part II.  In particular, the 1976 Copyright Act contains particular 
sections, as explored below, that call out explicitly for common-law decision-making 
and have evolved in their application over time.  These sections are concepts central 
to copyright law itself, including originality, fixation, copyrightable subject matter, 
the idea-expression distinction, and authorship.144  Specifically, the enacting 
Congress drew in large part on courts’ common-law understandings of copyright law 
 
 139. We address only those provisions in the tentative draft to be voted on by ALI members at the 
upcoming ALI meeting this year.  We do not understand other provisions, such as copyright law’s 
distribution right as discussed in Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, Restatements of Statutory 
Law:  The Curious Case of the Restatement of Copyright, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 285, 324–37 (2021), to 
be finalized or up for a membership vote at this time. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11. 
 141. Letter from Sen. Tillis et al., supra note 9. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See infra Part III.B–F. 
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to shape the Act and signaled that courts should continue using its common-law 
approach to interpret the Act.145  As such, a retelling of these statutory provisions 
and how courts have interpreted them is not only helpful to lawyers and courts in 
understanding copyright law, but also accords with the enacting Congress’s statutory 
framework.  Of course, even with the common-law-making approach that is so 
fundamental to much of the copyright statute, the formulators of the Restatement 
must take extraordinary care not to deviate from the statute and the courts’ 
interpretations of that statute, as we discuss in the subsequent sections. 
To be sure, there are less central parts of the 1976 Copyright Act—such as the 
eleven subsections of 17 U.S.C. § 110 exempting from infringement certain 
performances and displays, particularly some nonprofit and educational ones, and 
detailed rules in 17 U.S.C. § 111 governing secondary transmissions of broadcast 
programming by cable systems—that are less amenable to exposition and retelling.  
Because these statutory sections are byzantine in their details, less clarity can be 
gained and more accuracy can be lost by retelling them rather than referencing them. 
Although Congress has made some amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act, 
including the Copyright Term Extension Act,146 the Architectural Works Copyright 
Protection Act,147 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,148 it has left the core 
of the Act—with its rules of copyrightability, exclusive rights, infringement, and 
exclusions from infringement—virtually intact for the past four decades.  When 
Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, the most recent major revision of the 
federal copyright laws since 1909, it did so in large part because so many 
technologies—including motion pictures, sound recordings, radio, television, and 
communications satellites—had since become more commonplace and had affected 
the creation, copying, and distribution of copyrighted works in ways not anticipated 
by and not accommodated in the 1909 Act.149  As discussed in the following sections, 
with the 1976 Act, Congress chose to create a copyright statute for the ages by 
enacting generally applicable rules that courts could interpret and apply even with 
regard to technologies unforeseen at the time.150  Indeed, even though many more 
technologies have been created or become popular since—from the VCR and DVR 
to the internet to search engines and social media—Congress has not undertaken a 
major revision to the 1976 Act, and courts have addressed the implications for 
copyright law of such later-developed technologies by applying the 1976 statutory 
framework.151 
 
 145. See infra Part III.B–F. 
 146. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 101–106, 112 Stat. 2827, 
2827–29 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304). 
 147. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–706, 104 Stat. 5133, 5133–34 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–102, 120, 301). 
 148. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended throughout 17 U.S.C.). 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47–50 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 47 (1975). 
 150. See infra Part III.B–F. 
 151. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (VCR); Cartoon Network 
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (DVR); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (search engine); Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 
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In light of both the common law-esque statutory framework that Congress enacted 
in the 1976 Act and congressional desire to create a statute for the ages, a 
Restatement of Copyright Law, done thoughtfully and well, can help guide courts, 
lawyers, and law students, just as a Restatement of Contracts or Torts can.  If the 
distance between the 1909 and 1976 Acts is any indication, Congress will not be 
overhauling the copyright laws until approximately 2043.  Because of a shift in the 
political economy of copyright in recent decades, it might be even less likely that 
there is a major overhaul of central aspects of the copyright statute in the near or even 
distant future.  The 1976 Act itself was the result of decades of negotiation and 
compromise among content creators and distributors in various industries.152  Since 
then, with the rise of powerful online content intermediaries such as Google, the 
landscape has become further divided between those that favor stronger copyright 
protection and those that oppose it.153  The shift in political economy provides further 
reason to suspect that major legislative changes to the core of the copyright statute 
are unlikely, at least in the short term, giving a well-done Restatement of Copyright 
Law decades or more to be useful. 
We now turn to specific core provisions of the Copyright Act—those governing 
originality, fixation, copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, 
and authorship and ownership—to illustrate how the Restatement of Copyright Law 
is an appropriate and welcome retelling of copyright law. 
B. ORIGINALITY 
The Restatement’s provisions on copyright law’s originality requirement usefully 
retell the requirement by synthesizing the courts’ longtime common-law 
development of originality.  This was Congress’s intent when it invoked and inserted 
the courts’ understanding of the requirement into the 1976 Act without defining it. 
The 1976 Act provides copyright protection to “original works of authorship.”154  
In explaining this choice of phrasing, congressional legislative history emphasized 
that “[t]he phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, 
is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by 
the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute.”155  As the Supreme Court has 
made clear in a copyright case (and many other contexts too), “[i]t is . . . well 
 
585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (social media); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. 
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internet). 
 152. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 
859 (1987). 
 153. Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation:  A Skeptical Copyright Perspective, 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 838–39 (2013); Joel Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law 
in the Internet Economy, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1073, 1073–76 (2007). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 155. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975); cf. SUPPLEMENTARY 
REP. OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 89TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS., pt. 6, p. 3 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965) (“Our intention here is to maintain the established 
standards of originality . . .”).  Both congressional reports elaborated that “[t]his standard does not include 
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of 
copyright protection to require them.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50. 
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established that where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.”156  By 
explaining that it was “purposely le[aving] undefined” the term “original,” Congress 
in the 1976 Act was statutorily asking courts to interpret the term in light of the 
common-law meaning that the courts had already been attributing to “original.”157  
Congress was calling upon courts to continue common lawmaking along the same 
general path as they had previously been doing. 
In its first major interpretation of the originality requirement under the 1976 Act, 
the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. ruled 
that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and 
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”158  The Feist Court 
derived this interpretation from a long line of cases that understood originality to be 
constitutionally required based on congressional authorization to pass copyright laws 
protecting the “Writings” of “Authors.”159  Feist distilled its understanding of 
originality in part from two nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions.160  One 
construed “Writings” to be only those that “are original, and are founded in the 
creative powers of the mind.  The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of 
intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”161  
The other construed “Authors” to be “he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker,” and limited copyright to “original intellectual conceptions of the 
author.”162  Feist proceeded to elaborate why these analyses mean facts are never 
original but compilations of fact might sometimes nonetheless be original.163 
In subsequent decisions building on Feist and its predecessors, courts continued 
to refine the legal understanding of originality.  For example, the Tenth Circuit held 
that digital wire-frame models of cars are not original because they “are not so much 
independent creations as (very good) copies of [the underlying] vehicles.”164  The 
Eleventh Circuit ruled that blank forms for emergency room doctors to record 
encounters with patients are not original because they lack creativity for not 
conveying information.165  And the Northern District of California held that there 
can be sufficient creativity in HTML code to be original.166  As these examples 
 
 156. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (internal marks omitted). 
 157. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 50 (1975). 
 158. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1990). 
 159. Id. at 346 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 160. Id. at 346–47. 
 161. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 162. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
 163. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347–51.  For an exploration of the Supreme Court’s originality decisions and 
the Restatement’s attempt to “stick to a centrist, sometimes minimalist, narrative of Feist’s two-step 
framework” in view of case law concerning copyright in compilations and other works, see Justin Hughes, 
Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 383, 409 (2021). 
 164. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 165. Utopia Provider Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., LLC, 596 F.3d 1313, 1319–24 (11th Cir. 
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 166. Media.net Advert. FZ-LLC v. NetSeer, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1065–67 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
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illustrate, courts have continued to apply the common-law framework of originality 
clarified in Feist to new situations, new industries, and new forms of expression. 
The Restatement of Copyright Law’s treatment of the originality requirement 
synthesizes the courts’ common-law approach that Congress anticipated and 
specified.  Section 5 restates the statutory language—that “[t]he Copyright Act grants 
protection to ‘original works of authorship’”—and then Feist’s interpretation of that 
language in light of over a century of common lawmaking on originality.167  It says 
that “[f]or a work to be original, the work must be independently created by its 
author, as discussed in § 6, and must embody expression that is at least minimally 
creative, as discussed in § 7.”168 
Section 6 explains further that a work is independently created “if the author has 
contributed some expression to the work without copying that expression from any 
preexisting work.”169  As courts have frequently emphasized,170 the Section’s 
Comments elaborate that independent creation does not presuppose novelty, a much 
harder requirement to meet:  “In order to be independently created, expression must 
not be copied in its entirety from any preexisting work; the expression need not be 
novel or unique.”171  Furthermore, Comment b to § 6 explains that “[t]he fact that an 
author’s expression resembles a preexisting work does not mean that the author’s 
expression was not independently created, so long as the author did not, in fact, copy 
that preexisting work.”172 
Section 7 draws directly on Feist in elaborating the requirement that a work be 
minimally creative to be original:  “The requirement that a work embody expression 
that is at least minimally creative can be satisfied by an author’s creative choices.”173  
It continues to explain that “[i]n the case of a compilation, choices regarding the 
selection, coordination, or arrangement of elements can satisfy the minimal-
creativity requirement even if those elements are not themselves original.”174   
Further drawing on Feist and other case law, the Restatement specifies what does 
not constitute the requisite minimal creativity:  routine choices,175 externally 
 
 167. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 5, at 55. 
 168. Id.  Section 5’s Comments elaborate on the constitutional origins of the originality requirement.  
Id.  § 5 cmt. a, at 55. 
 169. Id. § 6, at 58. 
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 174. Id. 
 175. Id. § 7(c), at 63; see also Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (summing up this rule before applying it to the creativity of West’s arrangement of cases) 
(citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (alphabetic white pages telephone directory); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g 
Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1444 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (organization of 
yellow pages telephone directory)). 
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constrained choices,176 and significant investments of labor, time, or skill, without 
more.177 
The Restatement’s provisions on originality usefully restate copyright law by 
synthesizing the courts’ longstanding development of case law on this requirement 
in light of new situations and industries.  By not defining “original works of 
authorship” in the 1976 Act, Congress intentionally adopted the courts’ common-law 
understanding of the originality requirement and expected the courts to continue 
developing it in future cases.  By synthesizing this case law and summarizing it 
appropriately in §§ 5–7, the Restatement guides courts, lawyers, and others looking 
for an elaboration of the originality requirement that is nowhere provided in the 
statute itself. 
C. FIXATION 
Copyright law’s fixation requirement illustrates a different way in which the 
Restatement usefully retells copyright law.  With originality, Congress relied on 
existing and future common-law development to define the term.  With fixation, 
Congress expressly directed lawyers and judges to adapt this requirement for future 
technologies, leaving the requirement explicitly adaptable to future technologies 
without the need for congressional revision.  The Restatement collates the various 
ways courts have interpreted and applied this forward-looking statutory standard as 
technological circumstances have changed. 
The 1976 Act provides that to be copyrightable, works must be “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device.”178  The Act elaborates that a work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under 
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”179  The legislative history on this provision states that “the 
 
 176. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(c), at 63; see also Matthew Bender, 158 F.3d at 
682 (summing up this rule before applying it to the creativity of West’s arrangement of cases) (citing Mid 
Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1995) (title examiner reports); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. 
v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1991) (charts of statistics on horse races)); Comput. 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying this principle to computer 
programs, and reasoning that “a programmer’s freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by 
extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular 
program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is 
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the 
industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within the computer industry”). 
 177. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(d), at 63; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 
(“Without a doubt, the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine flout[s] basic copyright principles.”).  On externally 
constrained choices, the Restatement notes that they include “the function the work is intended to serve, 
the tools used to produce the work, or practices or conventions standard to a particular type of work.”  
Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 7(c), at 63. 
 178. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 179. Id. § 101. 
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definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or 
transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown 
electronically on a television or other cathode-ray tube, or captured momentarily in 
the ‘memory’ of a computer.”180 
Congress sought to achieve multiple goals with the fixation requirement in the 
1976 Act.  First, it inaugurated federal copyrightability at the point of fixation, a time 
earlier than under the 1909 Act, which required that a work be published (or 
registered) for copyright protection.181  Second, the 1976 Act detailed numerous 
criteria required for fixation, including “sufficient[] permanen[ce] or stab[ility]” and 
“a period of more than transitory duration.”182  Third, Congress allowed the fixation 
requirement to be satisfied when a work could be communicated “either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device,” which overturned a line of judicial rulings that, 
to Congress, perpetuated “the artificial and largely unjustifiable 
distinctions . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been 
made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”183 
Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, Congress made clear in its 
statutory wording that it wanted to avoid being compelled to revise this fixation 
requirement as technologies evolved.  Congress specified that the rule would require 
fixation “in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed.”184  
By adding these last five words, which might otherwise seem unnecessary, Congress 
signaled that courts should interpret and apply the fixation standard as they do to 
conventional books, films, and other already-existing media also to after-developed 
technologies not yet conceived.185 
Indeed, as new technologies developed, courts applied and clarified the statutory 
standard for new media and contexts.186  Consider videogames.  In 1982, the Third 
Circuit reasoned that an arcade video game satisfied the fixation requirement even 
though “the video game generates or creates ‘new’ images each time [it is played], 
notwithstanding the fact that the new images are identical or substantially identical 
 
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
 181. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9–22. 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51 (1975).  Congress was thereby 
overturning a rule that had principally been established by White-Smith Music Publ’n Co. v. Apollo Co., 
209 U.S. 1 (1908), with regard to player piano rolls. 
 184. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
 185. Congress did specifically address one important technology:  live broadcasts.  According to the 
House Report, “the definition of ‘fixation’ would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient 
reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other 
cathode ray tube.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53.  Congress made the choice to protect “live broadcasts—
sports, news coverage, live performances of music, etc.—that are reaching the public in unfixed form but 
that are simultaneously being recorded.”  Id. at 52.  It did so by adding the following sentence to the 
statute:  “A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes 
of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.”  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 186. Moreover, courts interpreted the fixation requirement as to already-existing media.  For 
example, a district court held that a bowl of perishable Vietnamese food is not fixed, reasoning that “a 
bowl of perishable food will, by its terms, ultimately perish,” and “a bowl of food which, once it spoils is 
gone forever, cannot be considered ‘fixed.’”  Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 
1046, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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to the earlier ones.”187  The court reasoned that “[t]he audiovisual work is 
permanently embodied in a material object, the memory devices, from which it can 
be perceived with the aid of the other components of the game.”188  The court also 
rejected an argument that the player’s participation in the videogame, which affected 
the audiovisual display shown, meant that the game was not fixed, reasoning that 
“there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and sounds 
of the game, and many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game 
regardless of how the player operates the controls.”189 
The Ninth Circuit also found computer software loaded into a computer’s random 
access memory (RAM) to be fixed even though the copy is temporary because it is 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”190  As 
applied to newly developed DVR technology, the Second Circuit distinguished the 
RAM scenario from a DVR system that temporary holds 1.2 seconds of data in a 
buffer:  “[U]nlike the data in cases like [the Ninth Circuit decision], which remained 
embodied in the computer’s . . . memory until the user turned the computer off, each 
bit of data here is rapidly and automatically overwritten as soon as it is processed.”191  
While the court does acknowledge that the inquiry is fact specific, it concludes that 
“these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in the buffer 
for only a ‘transitory’ period, thus failing the duration requirement” necessary for 
fixation.192 
The Restatement usefully and properly draws on the statute and this and other 
case law interpreting it to clarify the fixation requirement, which was meant to adapt 
over time to new technologies.  It quotes from the statute in § 8 and uses Comments 
to the Section to explain how courts have understood the statutory language.  For 
example, it specifies that paper books, electronic books, and USB flash drives are all 
requisite “tangible medi[a] of expression,” even though the latter two did not exist 
when the 1976 Act was enacted.193  It summarizes the “more than transitory 
duration” element as not establishing a bright line for fixation’s temporal 
requirement, but it also affirms both the Ninth and Second Circuit holdings (that 1.2 
seconds in a buffer is not sufficient for fixation, but a computer remaining booted up 
for several minutes after loading a program into memory is sufficient for fixation).194  
The Restatement helpfully illuminates that “[t]he holdings in the leading cases and 
the legislative history suggest that fixation requires an embodiment that lasts long 
 
 187. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 188. Id. (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101). 
 191. Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 8 cmt. b, at 74–75. 
 194. Id. § 8 cmts. d, g, at 74–78, 81–82. 
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enough to allow the enjoyment or exploitation of the work’s expressive content after 
the embodiment is initially made.”195 
Congress signaled through its articulation of the fixation requirement that it 
wanted courts to interpret and apply the elaborate statutory language even to new 
technologies not yet developed, and it did not plan to revise this language even upon 
emergence of new technologies.  As such, the Restatement usefully collects judicial 
interpretations of the statutory language both for existing and since-developed 
technologies and makes sense of the various fixation opinions in terms of audience 
enjoyment or exploitation. 
D. CATEGORIES OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
Retelling copyright law in a Restatement also benefits our understanding of the 
categories of copyrightable subject matter.  The 1976 Act delineates the extent of 
copyrightable subject matter broadly and generally with a non-exhaustive list 
referencing illustrative, indeed prototypical, categories of copyrightable subject 
matter.  The Restatement helpfully illuminates this subtle framework for 
copyrightable subject matter, analyzes why courts have not exploited it to the extent 
that they otherwise might, and highlights categories of copyrightable subject matter 
that might be less obvious to courts, lawyers, and others. 
Until the 1909 Act, each successive copyright statute enumerated a closed list of 
categories of copyrightable subject matter.  The first U.S. copyright statute, in 1790, 
provided protection only to maps, charts, and books.196  Over time, Congress 
repeatedly expanded the categories of copyrightable subject matter, by adding new 
types of works that could qualify for protection:  engravings, etchings, and prints in 
1802197; musical compositions in 1831198; dramatic compositions in 1856199; 
photographs in 1865200; and paintings, drawings, and statues in 1870.201  The 1909 
Act moved away from limiting copyright protection to an enumerated list by granting 
protection to “all the writings of an author.”202  The Act further noted that an 
enumerated list in the statute for the purpose of administrative categorization of 
registration applications “shall not be held to limit the subject-matter of 
copyright.”203  Nonetheless, courts and the Copyright Office read the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter as being coextensive with the enumerated categories 
 
 195. Id. § 8 cmt. d, at 77. 
 196. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
 197. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (1802). 
 198. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831). 
 199. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (1856). 
 200. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (1865). 
 201. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870). 
 202. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909). 
 203. Id. § 5.  The enumerated list contained books, periodicals, lectures, sermons, addresses, 
dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions, musical compositions, maps, works of art, reproductions of 
a work of art, drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character, photographs, prints, and 
pictorial illustrations.  Id.  Congress added motion-picture photoplays and motion pictures other than 
photoplays to this list in 1912, Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (1912), and sound 
recordings in 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
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and declined to extend protection to other works, including sound recordings and 
choreographic works.204 
Even though it might have seemed natural to read the 1909 Act’s treatment of 
copyrightable subject matter expansively, it was the 1976 Act that was first 
understood to extend copyright protection broadly beyond a list of categories of 
subject matter.  As discussed above, the 1976 Act extends copyright protection to 
fixed, original “works of authorship.”205  The Act elaborates that “[w]orks of 
authorship include the following categories:  (1) literary works; (2) musical works, 
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
(7) sound recordings.”206  The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 
later added “architectural works” to this list.207 
Congress was cognizant of the meaning of the word “include” preceding the list 
of the seven categories of “works of authorship” in the 1976 Act.  The legislative 
history explained that “[t]he use of the word ‘include’ . . . makes clear that the listing 
is illustrative and not limitative, and that the seven categories do not necessarily 
exhaust the scope of ‘original works of authorship’ that the bill is intended to 
protect.”208  In fact, a previous congressional study suggested that the use of broader 
statutory language for the first time in the 1909 Act “indicated a legislative desire to 
escape from rigorous adherence to the objects specifically enumerated in the 
statute.”209  Congress did not want to have to legislatively add to the categories of 
copyrightable subject matter as it had multiple times since 1790.  It sought to create 
a capacious sense of copyrightable subject matter by providing protection broadly to 
“works of authorship,”210 while also explaining the prototypical and indisputable 
 
 204. Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 661 (2d Cir. 1955) (sound 
recordings); Regulations of the Copyright Office, 21 Fed. Reg. 6021 (Aug. 11, 1956); Borge Varmer, 
Copyright in Choreographic Works (Study No. 28), in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG., COPYRIGHT L. REVISION:  STUDS. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 26–28, at 94–96 (Comm. Print 1961) 
(choreographic works); STAFF OF N.Y.U. L. REV., The Meaning of “Writings” in the Copyright Clause of 
the Constitution (Study No. 3), in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT L. 
REVISION:  STUDS. PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS OF THE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDIES 1–4, at 74–76 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter N.Y.U. L. REV., 
Meaning of “Writings”]. 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); supra Part III.B. 
 206. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). 
 207. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended throughout 17 U.S.C.). 
 208. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52 (1975). 
 209. N.Y.U. L. REV., Meaning of “Writings”, supra note 204, at 74.  That said, the study went on to 
observe that “it seems that anything outside the [enumerations] of [the 1909 Act] has little chances for 
registration.”  Id. at 75.  Moreover, the study cast doubt on this restrictive interpretation of the 1909 Act, 
in part because Theodore Roosevelt, in his 1905 address to Congress, “when speaking of the need to revise 
the copyright laws, part of his description was ‘they omit provision for many articles which, under modern 
reproductive processes, are entitled to protection.’”  Id. 
 210. Despite the breadth of copyrightable subject matter, not all subject matter is copyrightable as a 
work of authorship.  As set out in the legislative history, “there are unquestionably other areas of existing 
subject matter that this bill does not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to.”  H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51 (1975). 
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categories of copyrightable subject matter by listing them as protected 
subcategories.211  As the legislative history explains, Congress set out to list as these 
illustrative categories “the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with 
sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope 
of particular categories.”212 
Congress recognized the need for the statute to adapt to creative practices, 
reporting that “[a]uthors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, 
but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will 
take.”213  Indeed, since that statement in the mid-1970s, digital books, blogs, internet-
streamed videos, and social media posts are only a few new expressive methods that 
have arisen.  Congress expressed an intent to avoid revising the copyright statute 
each time such expressive methods emerged:  “The bill does not intend either to 
freeze the scope of copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into 
areas completely outside the present congressional intent.”214  It sought to elaborate 
copyrightable subject matter so that “neither . . . that subject matter is unlimited nor 
that new forms of expression within that general area of subject matter would 
necessarily be unprotected.”215 
The Restatement elucidates this subtle structure by quoting the statutory language 
in § 2 and then explaining further how courts have ruled on expansive claims of 
copyrightable subject matter.  In particular, § 2’s Comments indicate that although 
Congress undoubtedly authorized courts to locate copyrightable subject matter 
beyond the illustrative enumerated categories, “[n]o court to date has recognized as 
copyrightable any material that falls entirely outside all of the enumerated 
categories.”216  This surprising doctrinal development might be explained in several 
 
 211. Cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 739–40 (2009) 
(explaining how more specific dependent claims in patent law “have a ‘central claim’-like communicative 
effect of highlighting prototypes of the associated [and broader] independent claim”). 
 212. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52.  One scholar has argued against this 
approach.  R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the ‘Next Great Copyright Act’, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1502 (2014) (“Congress is the appropriate and best-positioned actor to 
determine what should and should not be protected by copyright, both because the scope of copyrightable 
subject matter is a policy question best answered by the elected legislature and because Congress is better 
equipped to appropriately tailor any protection it decides to grant.”).  Another has argued that there are 
principles courts and others can use to deem matter beyond the enumerated categories as protectable works 
of authorship.  Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 
17 (2016). 
 213. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51. 
 214. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51.  Even so, the Copyright Office has 
refused to register claims of copyright for matters that do not lie within one of Congress’s illustrative 
categories of subject matter.  Registration of Claims To Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,607 (Jun. 22, 
2012). 
 215. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51.  Nonetheless, Congress recognized 
that future Congresses might decide to change the bounds of copyrightable subject matter.  H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 52; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 51. 
 216. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. c,  at 11 (giving basketball games and 
parades as examples of judicially rejected expansions of subject matter) (citing, in the Reporters’ Notes, 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the enumerated 
“list does not include athletic events, and, although the list is concededly non-exclusive, such events are 
neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed categories”); Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Cont’l 
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ways.  Perhaps courts have not yet found fixed and original works of authorship 
outside of the broad illustrative categories that Congress established.  Or perhaps 
courts lack a clear method to determine whether a new subject matter category ought 
to qualify.  Alternatively, maybe courts mistakenly believe they cannot protect under 
copyright law any matter outside of the illustrative categories listed in the Act.  The 
Restatement’s Comments include this analysis and diagnose courts’ unwillingness to 
expand subject matter beyond the illustrative categories as due to “[t]he breadth of 
the definitions of the statute’s enumerated categories of works of authorship, the 
paucity of congressional guidance on recognizing other categories of works of 
authorship, and the approach that courts and the Copyright Office have taken to 
claims of copyright in material falling outside all of the enumerated categories.”217   
By providing this empirical information together with an analysis of it, the 
Restatement helps courts decide whether and when to extend subject matter beyond 
the illustrative categories.  Should a future court think other courts unduly restricted 
application of the categories of copyrightable subject matter to the enumerated 
statutory list, it might rule that a new category is justified under suitable 
circumstances.  If a court believes that it lacks guidance on the question of adding to 
the subject matter categories, it might conclude that a “presumption against copyright 
protection for material that falls outside of the statute’s enumerated categories” has 
not been overcome and deem the capacious enumerated categories sufficient on 
which to rest its decision.218  Either way, the Restatement gives courts a helpful 
analytical framework to approach copyrightable subject matter by retelling the 
statutory provisions in the context of rendered decisions on the categories of 
copyrightable subject matter over the past several decades. 
Two other reasons make the Restatement’s attention to categories of 
copyrightable subject matter critical for the clarification of copyright law.  First, the 
category of copyrightable subject matter into which a work is placed can affect the 
work’s scope of protection as well as the fact of protection.219  Second, the categories 
are not intuitive to non-experts and thus their further explanation in the Restatement 
is helpful.  For example, § 2 sets out that “[c]omputer programs are protectable under 
the Copyright Act as a type of literary work.”220  Although a “literary work” might 
seem to encompass only books and periodicals, for example, it is in fact defined as a 
work (other than an audiovisual work) “expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal 
or numerical symbols or indicia.”221  The Restatement’s Comments explain that 
software programs fit literally within this category, that Congress intended to protect 
 
Broad. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1502–04 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (reasoning that a parade is not a “work of 
authorship”)). 
 217. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. c, at 11. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 113(c) (stating that the scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works does not extend to their lawful reproduction in useful articles that are offered for sale or 
other distribution to the public in connection with advertisements). 
 220. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2(b), at 9. 
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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them under this category, and that courts have followed this view.222  By contrast, 
there is no definition of “musical works” in the Act, and Restatement commentary 
usefully explains that although “no court decision offers a comprehensive 
interpretation of the term, . . . various decisions have identified melody, rhythm, 
harmony, and tempo as among the elements of a musical work other than lyrics.”223  
The Restatement similarly summarizes the definitions or relevant aspects of the other 
categories, as courts have understood them.224 
By traversing courts’ interpretations of what constitutes copyrightable subject 
matter, the Restatement helpfully sheds light on the subtle statutory framework, how 
and why courts have not exploited the extent of this framework, and how to 
understand and apply the enumerated categories of subject matter should new forms 
of expression arise in the future. 
E. IDEA-EXPRESSION DISTINCTION 
The “idea-expression distinction” in copyright law is fundamental to the law’s 
structure and the subject of ongoing controversy especially in the digital age.225  The 
idea-expression distinction is shorthand for various matter—including but not 
limited to ideas—that lies outside the scope of copyright, as compared with 
expression, which is protectable if it is a fixed and original work of authorship.  
Specifically, the Copyright Act of 1976 excludes certain subject matter from 
copyright protection:  “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”226  As the statutory language 
attests, unprotected matter extends to subject matter beyond ideas.227  The 
Restatement breaks down what appears as a singular statutory rule into 
subcategories, each with its own distinct analysis as understood by courts.  At a time 
when this statutory provision is subject to increasing attention, the Restatement’s 
clarification and analysis of the case law will advance copyright practice. 
 
 222. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 2 cmt. d, at 11–12 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 
at 54 (1976) (writing that the category of literary works “includes computer data bases, and computer 
programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression of original ideas, 
as distinguished from the ideas themselves”)). 
 223. Id. § 2 cmt. e, at 12 (citing, in the Reporters’ Notes, Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 
1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 
933, 938 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
 224. Id. § 2 cmts. f–j, l, at 13–19 (dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and 
architectural works). 
 225. Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc., No. 18-956 (argued Oct. 7, 2020), currently pending before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, is an example of the centrality of this distinction to copyright law and of its 
contested status. 
 226. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 227. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.1 (2020); Pamela Samuelson, Why 
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 
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The meaning of § 102(b) requires application of case law as well as close attention 
to the enumerated list of categories it contains.  It is therefore a statutory provision 
whose interpretation demands a combination of interpretive processes described 
above.228  As with Congress’s view of its encoded originality requirement in the 1976 
Act, legislative history makes clear that § 102(b) “in no way enlarges or contracts 
the scope of copyright protection under the present law.”229  Both House and Senate 
reports elaborate that “[i]ts purpose is to restate, in the context of the new . . . Federal 
system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains 
unchanged.”230  Like the originality requirement, this rule is thus well-suited to being 
retold in the Restatement of Copyright through an analysis of the case law over 
time.231 
The Restatement also advances the clarification of copyright law because the 
“idea-expression distinction” moniker masks at least three longstanding common-
law “_________-expression” distinctions that have been clarified over time.232  First, 
a process-expression distinction extends to the statutory categories of procedure, 
process, system, and method of operation.  Second, an idea-expression distinction 
covers the statutory categories of idea, concept, and principle.  Third, a fact-
expression distinction exists but is harder to identify literally in the statute’s language 
other than with the word “discovery.”  These subcategories arise from the 
enumerated list and guide the application of this critical statutory provision.  The 
Restatement’s treatment of this section provides welcome assistance for this complex 
but important task.  
Though they overlap, the principal policies underlying each subcategory are 
somewhat distinct.233  Processes are excluded from the scope of copyright protection 
because, as the Supreme Court held in 1879 in Baker v. Selden, “[t]hat is the province 
of []patent, not of copyright.”234  For a patent to issue, the Patent Office must 
scrutinize the invention claimed in the application for novelty, nonobviousness, and 
other strict requirements.  Copyrighted material undergoes no such scrutiny or 
examination.235  As Paul Goldstein explains, “[d]octrinally, the presence of patent 
law’s rigorous standards cautions courts in copyright infringement cases not to allow 
copyright, with its notably lax standards, to protect functional elements of 
copyrighted works.”236  Ideas are understood differently.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, ideas are excluded from the scope of copyright protection so that they can 
 
 228. See supra Part III.B–C. 
 229. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (1975). 
 230. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 54 (emphasis added). 
 231. See supra Part III.B. 
 232. JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 59 (2d version 2020); cf. Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger 
Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF U.S.A. 417, 438–39 (2016) (identifying at least six distinctions with 
expression in the context of merger doctrine, including idea-expression, fact-expression, law-expression, 
process-expression, and system-expression). 
 233. FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 232, at 59. 
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be left free for all to use as building blocks to create further expression.237  Courts 
attribute this principle to protecting First Amendment values.238  Courts explain the 
exclusion of facts from copyright protection on the ground that they too provide the 
building blocks for all expression, but facts also lack originality because they are not 
independently created by an author.239  Court cases have applied rules for each of 
these distinctions in light of their underlying purposes.240  The Restatement’s 
summary and analysis of each exclusion as courts have described them will aid the 
development of law, especially regarding information goods and technology, which 
are critical areas in dispute today. 
In particular, § 12 of the Restatement repeats the statute’s statement that copyright 
protection extends to expression but “does not ‘extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.’”241  Section 12 further explains that copyright protection “does not extend to 
any fact regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”242  Section 14 specifically addresses the exclusion of ideas 
from the scope of copyright protection:  “The scope of copyright protection for a 
work of authorship does not ‘extend to any idea,’ ‘concept,’ or ‘principle,’ 
‘regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.’”243  Section 15, which has not yet been released for membership 
approval, will address separately the exclusion of methods from the scope of 
copyright protection, whereas § 16, which has also not yet been released, will address 
the exclusion of facts from the scope of copyright protection.244  As the Comments 
explain, the Restatement sorts and groups these items into three categories rather than 
deal with the idea-expression distinction monolithically because 
[i]n light of the plain language of [the statute], the word “idea” [in this context] is best 
understood to operate as shorthand for those elements of a work that by their nature are 
not protected by copyright on the basis of underlying policy concerns recognized by 
Congress in [the statute] and in judicial decisions interpreting the scope of copyright 
protection.245   
 
 237. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
 238. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 239. See id; Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. 
 240. For cases that discuss the process-expression distinction, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 
Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), and Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of Ind., LP v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 
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 241. Restatement Tentative Draft No. 1 (2020) § 12(a)–(b), at 115 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 242. Id. § 12 (b)(2), at 115.  It then continues that “[t]hese elements to which the scope of copyright 
protection does not extend are categorized and discussed in §§ 14 to 16.” Id. § 12(b), at 115. 
 243. Id. § 14, at 129. 
 244. Id. § 12 cmt. e, at 120. 
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Furthermore, the Restatement elaborates that “[g]rouping the statutorily identified 
unprotectable elements of a work of authorship into these three categories [of ideas, 
methods, and facts] assists in understanding the rationales for, and applications of, 
the exclusion with respect to different types of unprotectable elements.”246 
 Although we cannot yet analyze §§ 15 and 16, the Restatement’s disaggregation 
of the idea-expression distinction in §§ 13 and 14 is illustrative.  To elucidate the 
distinction between expression and other types of matter, § 13 explains that “[t]he 
scope of copyright protection for ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression’ extends to expression in a work that is original to the work’s 
author or authors.”247  By contrast, § 14 sets out a major category of matter excluded 
from the scope of copyright protection:  ideas, concepts, and principles, as noted 
above.248  A Comment to the Section explains that ideas are excluded from copyright 
protection “to ensure that copyright protection will not inhibit others from employing 
basic intellectual building blocks or from exploring existing ideas using their own 
expression.  To encourage authors to create expressive works, copyright must allow 
all authors to use building blocks basic to each medium of expression.”249 The 
Comments proceed to explain how courts have distinguished unprotected ideas from 
protectable expression by using a levels-of-abstraction analysis.250  Because, as the 
Restatement notes, courts apply this as a “loose standard” instead of a precise rule,  
the Restatement analysis provides a framework that courts may consider when 
classifying an aspect of a work as idea or expression:  “[T]he focus should be on the 
purposes that animate the exclusion—namely, appropriately limiting the scope of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights such that subsequent creators are not prevented 
from reusing basic intellectual building blocks or from exploring existing ideas using 
their own expression.”251  The reasons for excluding ideas from the scope of 
copyright protection may be distinct from those for excluding processes and facts, 
something that might not be apparent when they are all lumped together without 
analytical structure in the statute in § 102(b).  The Restatement helpfully 
systematizes the various categorical exclusions, explains why ideas are unprotected, 
and describes how that affects an analysis of categorizing material as idea or 
expression. 
F. AUTHORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP 
A final illustration of how the Restatement helpfully illuminates copyright law is 
with regard to copyright’s provisions on authorship and ownership.  These provisions 
rely on common law in other areas, particularly contract, property, and agency.  As 
 
 246. Id. § 12 cmt. e, at 120. 
 247. Id. § 13, at 125 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). 
 248. Id. § 14, at 129 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
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such, the Restatement elaborates these provisions by integrating these other areas of 
common law when relevant to illuminate copyright law on authorship and ownership. 
The copyright statute provides that “[c]opyright in a work protected under this 
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.  The authors of a joint work 
are coowners of copyright in the work.”252  A “joint work” is statutorily defined as 
“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions 
be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”253  The rule 
is different for a “work made for hire,” statutorily defined as either “a work prepared 
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” or “a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as [one of a number of enumerated categories of 
works, including motion picture or test], if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”254  
For a work made for hire, “the employer or other person for whom the work was 
prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed 
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised 
in the copyright.”255 
The statute also provides that these rights can be transferred:  “The ownership of 
a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or 
by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by 
the applicable laws of intestate succession.”256  The statute explains further that a 
transfer of copyright ownership is “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or 
any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place 
of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”257  The statute specifies that for 
such a transfer to be effective, other than if it is by operation of law, there must be 
“an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer . . . in writing 
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized 
agent.”258 
These provisions depend in substantial part on other areas of the common law, 
especially contract, property, and agency laws, and courts have interpreted these 
statutory provisions on authorship and ownership in light of those areas of the law.  
For example, the Supreme Court has understood the statutory provisions on works 
made for hire as Congress codifying the common law of agency.  In seeking to 
understand when a work was prepared by “an employee within the scope of his or 
her employment,” as the statute requires, the Supreme Court explained:  “The Act 
nowhere defines the terms ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment.’  It is, however, 
well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled 
meaning under . . . common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise 
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dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these 
terms.’”259  The Court concluded that the statute suggests “Congress’ intent to 
incorporate the agency law definition” of “employee” into the copyright statute.260  
Citing the Restatement of Agency, the Court then elaborated the thirteen factors that 
must be considered to determine whether a work is created by an employee, including 
“the source of instrumentalities and tools” and “the provision of employee 
benefits.”261  Other federal courts have similarly interpreted the requirement that the 
work done be in the “scope of employment” to be adjudged by common-law agency 
principles.262 
Also consider the law of joint works, which relies not on agency law but property 
law.  As Congress explained in the legislative history to the 1976 Act, “[t]here is . . . 
no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the co-
owners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed.”263  The 
legislative history further specified that “[u]nder the bill, as under the present law, 
co-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common.”264  From 
this legislative direction, courts have relied on the common law of property to grant 
co-authors of a joint work an undivided fractional interest in the work.265  
These statutory provisions also rely heavily on the common law of contracting to 
define rights with regard to joint works, works made for hire, and transfers of 
ownership.  For example, courts refer to contracts when assessing whether the 
putative co-authors intended a work to be a “joint work.”  The Ninth Circuit has 
specifically held that “[t]he best objective manifestation of a shared intent . . . is a 
contract saying that the parties intend to be or not to be co-authors.”266  Additionally, 
for a work to be made for hire by an independent contractor, “the parties [must] 
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be 
considered a work made for hire.”267  And a work that otherwise would constitute a 
work made for hire may instead be owned by the employee if “the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them.”268  Finally, the 
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statute requires “an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer . . . in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such 
owner’s duly authorized agent” for a transfer of ownership by voluntary 
conveyance.269  These requirements are similar to and draw on writing requirements 
in contract law, combining the common law of contracts with the 1976 Copyright 
Act for its proper application.270 
The Restatement sheds light on how these other areas of common law—agency, 
contract, and property—interact with copyright’s statutory provisions on authorship 
and ownership.  The Restatement does so by including these other legal areas in its 
retelling of copyright law.  For example, § 22, which governs joint works, explains 
how contracts may be helpful, but not always dispositive, in assessing whether a 
work is co-authored.  It states after quoting the statutory definition of a “joint work,” 
that “[t]o have the requisite intent to be a co-author of a joint work, an author must 
intend, at the time the author creates that author’s contribution to the work, that the 
contribution be merged into a joint work as a unitary whole.”271  A Comment to § 22 
elaborates that “[e]xpress statements of intent—for example, in a contract between 
co-authors—are strong evidence that the parties making the statements possessed the 
requisite intent.”272  Another Comment emphasizes the helpfulness of contracting by 
providing that 
an express agreement among the contributors that a particular contributor will be listed 
as a co-author of the work would offer evidence to support a finding that the 
contributions made by that particular contributor were sufficient to qualify the 
contributor as a joint author; contributors are generally unlikely (absent a contrary 
industry custom) to agree to list as a co-author a contributor who does not make what 
they regard as an authorial contribution to the work as a whole.273   
The Restatement Comments also recognize, however, that a contract directed to co-
authorship may not be definitive:  “[A] contract in which parties agree to be co-
authors of a work cannot make someone a co-author of a joint work if the 
requirements discussed in this Section are not met.”274 
Sections 22 and 23 elaborate the role of the common law of property in ownership 
of joint works.  Section 22 provides that “[t]he co-authors who create a joint work 
are the initial co-owners of the copyright in that joint work, as specified in § 23.”275  
Section 23 further specifies that “[u]nless the co-authors of a joint work have agreed 
otherwise, each co-author owns an equal undivided fractional interest in the 
copyright in the entire joint work.”276  Due to this ownership, § 23 provides that any 
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co-author can exercise the rights of a copyright owner or authorize another to do so 
nonexclusively subject to a duty to account to the other co-owners or to transfer its 
fractional interest, but the co-owners unanimously can act together to authorize 
another to exercise exclusive copyright rights or to transfer the entire copyright.277 
With regard to works made for hire, § 24 of the Restatement explains the 
relevance of the common law of agency to the statute’s interpretation:  One way for 
a work to be made for hire is if it is “‘prepared by an employee within the scope of 
his or her employment’ as determined under the general common law of agency.”278  
Comments to this Section explain how courts have used this common law of agency 
to determine whether someone is an employee acting within the scope of their 
employment.279  Section 24 also underscores the relevance of contracting, whether 
to transform a work created by an independent contractor into a work made for hire 
or to deem a work created by an employee within the scope of their employment not 
to be a work made for hire.280  The Comments elaborate on the content and timing 
of such agreements by describing many court decisions arising in diverse contexts 
and industries.281 
Finally, with regard to transfers of copyright, § 25 of the Restatement states that 
“[t]o be valid, transfers by voluntary conveyance . . . must satisfy the written 
instrument requirement addressed in § 26.”282  Section 26 expands on the written 
instrument requirement by quoting the statutory language governing transfers:  “A 
transfer of copyright ownership by voluntary conveyance, as described in § 25(b)(1), 
‘is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the 
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s 
duly authorized agent.’”283  The Section explains that “[t]his is known as the written 
instrument requirement.”284  The Restatement then helpfully explains the array of 
circumstances when the written instrument requirement does not apply:  to “non-
exclusive licenses” (because they are excluded from the statutory definition of 
transfers of copyright),285 transfers under the terms of a will or by intestate 
succession,”286 and “transfers by operation of law” (because they are not transfers by 
voluntary conveyance).287  The Restatement Comments disaggregate the written 
instrument requirement into three elements:  “an instrument of conveyance, or a note 
or memorandum of the transfer”; “in writing”; and “signed by the owner of the rights 
conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”288  The Comments summarize the 
case law and other statutes governing each of these elements, including that the 
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writing can have been prepared for another purpose and can have been signed 
electronically,289 and that courts have split on the legitimacy of a writing post-dating 
the agreement to transfer.290 
The Restatement provides a robust retelling of copyright law by integrating the 
external common law of contract, agency, and property on which copyright’s law of 
authorship and ownership relies.  These aspects of copyright law are central to the 
law’s operation in the creative and innovative industries, which have dramatically 
evolved since the 1976 passage of the Copyright Act.  The Restatement’s framework 
for and clarification of this complicated area of law will be a welcome resource for 
lawyers, judges, and students. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Restatement of Copyright Law is a useful retelling of copyright 
law.  This Restatement project fits well within the ALI’s mandate.291  The act of 
restating in the manner that is the ALI’s signature form is also consistent with the 
legal practice, which inevitably involves acts of legal exposition and interpretation, 
even for statutory law.292  The copyright statute draws on longstanding common law, 
gestures to courts to continue developing this common law to interpret the statute, 
and is a statute for the ages.  Judges and lawyers—whatever their views on copyright 
policy—should embrace this carefully crafted Restatement draft on originality, 
fixation, categories of copyrightable subject matter, the idea-expression distinction, 
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